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Title of Dissertation:  An Assessment of the Environmental Regulatory 
Framework Regarding Increasing Tourism Activity in 
Antarctica 
 
Degree:  Master of Science 
 
The “Antarctic Treaty System” (ATS) was signed by several States and 
established this region as an international area dedicated to science and research. It 
is true that tourism in Antarctica is a well-established and profitable industry which 
contributes significantly to the economic development of the countries involved. 
However, this increasing activity in Antarctica could endanger the fragile 
environment in the case of a catastrophic maritime accident. This research examined 
the regulatory framework relating to the environmental protection of the region, by 
evaluating past accidents and at the same time factorizing the increasing presence 
of cruise ships in this pristine polar area. To do that, it is important to understand 
how this activity is regulated, what are the factors that jeopardize the environment, 
which are the instruments created by IMO and private parties to deal with this issue, 
and finally assess if these regulations are enough to ensure safe operations. A 
thorough literature review regarding the extended regulatory framework (IMO, 
IAATO, Antarctic Treaty) was conducted. In addition, examining the level of 
conformity of the operators and the effectiveness of the inspection realized by 
member States of the ATS was also included. Twenty-five vessels were inspected 
by the observers under the Antarctic Treaty regulations, MARPOL and IAATO 
regulations, on matters like crew experience and training, navigation and 
communication equipment, oil pollution and waste management, and environmental 
protection. The results indicate that the regulations have a positive impact on the 
operations assuring best-practices to protect the environment. However, certain 
incidents demonstrate the need to enhance safe operations in Antarctica. The issue 
of manning levels is clearly standing out as an issue of further investigation in order 
to safely and effectively conduct high manning levels operations in this hostile 
environment, with very adverse weather conditions. 
 
 
KEYWORDS:  Antarctica, Tourism Activity, Environmental impact, The 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL), International Association of 
Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO). 
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1.1 Background and context  
 
In 1959, the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, 
New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America signed the Antarctic Treaty and other related agreements. 
Collectively called the “Antarctic Treaty System” (ATS), this treaty established the 
region under discussion as an international area dedicated to science and research. The 
Antarctic Treaty (1959) states that the continent “shall continue forever to be used 
exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of 
international discord.” In addition, the Treaty contains 14 articles which establish key 
elements essential to peaceful international coordination on the continent. As an 
example, it includes a forbiddance of military activity, promotes peaceful scientific 
research and international information exchange from research on the continent, no 
territorial sovereignty claims by the signatories, and the application of the treaty to all 
areas south of the 60-degree latitude line in the southern hemisphere (The Antarctic 
Treaty, 1959). Furthermore, in 1991 the parties of the Antarctic Treaty adopted the 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (The Madrid Protocol). 
This Protocol provides comprehensive protection of Antarctica establishing 
environmental principles for the conduct of all activities, the establishment of a 
Committee for Environmental Protection, requiring to the parties the development of 
contingency plans to respond to environmental emergencies and providing for the 
elaboration of rules relating to liability for environmental harm (Australian 
Government, Department of the Environment and Energy, 2016). 
As the Antarctic continent has become an object of interest to the entire humanity, it 
is not surprising that year after year more people are tempted to visit this place. 
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Tourism in Antarctica is a well-established and a profitable industry which contribute 
to the economic development of the countries involved in the activity. To understand 
the dimension of the tourism activity, the International Association Antarctica Tour 
Operator [IAATO] (2019) state that by the 1991-92 season 6,400 tourists visited 
Antarctica, and by the season 2013-14 the count ascended to 37,000 visitors. 
Nevertheless, in the last years the growth of this activity has triggered debates among 
policy-makers, the tourist industry and other stakeholders about its possible 
consequences in relation to safety and environment protection. A series of gaps, 
inconsistencies and deficiencies regarding the regulation of tourism operations were 
identified, focusing on requirements rather than regulation or restrictions (Lamers, 
2009). Therefore, it is important to investigate the possible environmental impacts 
associated with the increasing tourism activity in Antarctica, and if the current 
regulations are adequate to protect this region. 
Classification of tourism in Antarctica  
According to the IAATO (2018), the geographic range of tourism activities in the 
Antarctic Peninsula region can be divided into several sub-areas: 
 South Orkneys Including Laurie, Coronation Islands; 
 Elephant Island including nearby islands; 
 The South Shetland Islands Including Deception, Livingston, King George, 
Low and Smith Islands; 
 Northeast Antarctic Peninsula from Cape Dubouzet (63 16'S, 57 03'W) to 
James Ross Island; 
 Northwest Antarctic Peninsula from Cape Dubouzet (63 16'S, 57 03'W) to the 
north end of Lemaire Channel; 
 Southwest Antarctic Peninsula from the north end of Lemaire Channel to the 





Figure 1.1 shows a map of Human Footprint across Antarctica where it is possible to 




Figure 1.1 Spatial Mapping of Human Footprint across Antarctica. Retrieved from 
www.journals.plos.org  
 
Regarding the type and duration of the Antarctic tourism options to travel, it is possible 
to classify them as:  
 Antarctic Peninsula trips from port to port in South America such us Ushuaia 
(Argentina) and Punta Arenas (Chile); longer trips sail to South Georgia and/or 
the Malvinas Islands; 
 Antarctica Peninsula trips fly from South America over the Drake Passage and 
joining the ship in Antarctica. There are two modes of travelling: fly both ways 
or sail one and fly the other; 
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 Eastern Antarctica trips depart from and return to Australia or New Zealand, 
sometimes from one to the other (Ward, 2018). 
 
Regulating tourism in Antarctica 
To manage effectively all these complex touristic activities, in 1991 seven Antarctic 
tour operators started to work together dedicated to advocate, promote and practice 
environmentally responsible private-sector travel to Antarctica. The outcome of this 
collaboration was the creation of the International Association of Antarctica Tour 
Operators (IAATO). Actually, there are more than 100 member-organizations 
representing different countries around the world and the number continues increasing. 
Furthermore, the mission of IAATO was to create guidelines served as the basis for 
developing Recommendation XVIII-1 of the ATS, which includes a guidance for 
Antarctic visitors (including contents about protection of Antarctic wildlife, respect 
for protected areas, respect for scientific research, how to be safe and how to keep 
Antarctica pristine) and for non-governmental tour organizers (Key obligations on 
organizers and operators, and procedures to be followed by organizers and operators). 
In addition, IAATO provides a forum for Antarctic tourism stakeholders to work 
together and develop the highest standards and best practices management to reach the 
best protection of the Antarctic environment (IAATO, 2018). 
 
The Antarctic Treaty System 
Activities in Antarctica and its surrounding waters are regulated by an aggregate of 
agreements between nations known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS): 
 The Antarctic Treaty, 1959; 
 The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, 1972; 
 The Convention of the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLAR), 1980; 
 The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid 
Protocol), 1991. 
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These agreements are legally binding and purpose-built for the unique geographical, 
environmental and political characteristics of the Antarctic and form a sturdy 
international governance framework for the region. Furthermore, legal liabilities apply 
to all countries signatories to the agreements including freedom of scientific 
investigation and the exchange of scientific findings, non-militarization of Antarctica 
and the Southern Ocean, and accommodating the positions of all Parties on issues of 
sovereignty. The Madrid Protocol was created as a supplement to the Antarctic Treaty 
and has established a basis for environmental protection in the area. Furthermore, it 
provides  meaningful guidelines for responsible touristic visits to Antarctica. In 
addition, under the protocol mineral resource exploration, mining and oil drilling is 
banned indefinitely and the environment must be a fundamental consideration in the 
planning and conduct of all activities in Antarctica (Australian Government, 
Department of the Environment and Energy, 2016). 
Despite the fact that the Protocol has been criticized because it is too broad and open 
to different interpretations, Article 3 sets environmental principles and requires that 
any activities carried out there are “planned and conducted so as to limit adverse 
impacts on the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems” (The 
Madrid Protocol, 1991), including avoiding adverse effects or significant changes to 
nearly all aspects of the natural and physical environment. Moreover, Section 4 of this 
Article states that tourism activities in Antarctica must take place in a mode consistent 
with the Article 3 and shall be modified or canceled if they have the potential to result 
in impacts on the Antarctic environment. Furthermore, Article 8 of the Protocol 
specifically mentions tourism activities and provides the details for a system of 
Environmental Impact Assessment; consequently, all tourism operators associated (by 
flag state or other means) with ATS signatories’ countries are bound by the 






The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) 
 
It is well known that the global warming has been affecting in different ways the 
environment across the world. One of the most famous is the ice melting on the Poles 
of the Earth, which creates an opportunity to find more easily open waters for  
navigation (Dalaklis & Baxevani, 2016; Dalaklis & Baxevani, 2017). As an example, 
the ice melting in the Arctic has created an “open window” for  commercial shipping 
activities due to the new maritime routes across the pole region. Moreover, this 
opportunity is also exploited by the tourism operators who take advantage of the less 
ice concentrations in Antarctica (particularly during summer season in South 
Hemisphere) to increase the cruise vessel activities in the area. Due to these increasing 
activities, the IMO has developed the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters (the Polar Code), as a regulation to avoid a possible environmental impact and 
increase the safety operations level in Polar regions (Dalaklis, Ölçer, Balini & Dewitz, 
2017; Dalaklis & Baxevani, 2018; Dalaklis, Baxevani, & Siousiouras, 2018).   
 
The Polar Code was designed to cover the full range of shipping-related matters (ship 
design, construction, and equipment relevant to navigation) in waters surrounding the 
poles; moreover, it provides operational and training concerns, search and rescue 
matters, and the protection of the unique environment and eco-systems of the polar 
regions. This Code covers the full range of design, construction, equipment, 
operational, training, search and rescue and environmental protection matters relevant 
to ships operating in the inhospitable waters surrounding the two poles. In addition, 
the Polar Code includes mandatory measures covering safety, (part I-A) and pollution 
prevention (part II-A) and recommendatory provisions for both (parts I-B and II-B). 
This Code was developed by IMO due to the fact that vessels operating in the Antarctic 
environments are exposed to a number of unique risks. For instance, poor weather 
conditions and the relative lack of good charts, communication systems, and other 
navigational aids pose challenges for masters and seafarers. Furthermore, the 
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1.2 Problem statement  
 
The increase in tourist activities in Antarctica can irreversibly affect a fragile and 
pristine ecosystem. This is an issue that has been debated for several years between 
the scientific community and the tourism stakeholders. As an example, the IAATO 
(2004) claimed that: “In 35 years of Antarctic tourism there is very little discernible 
impact from tourist activities at any of the landing sites in the Antarctic”; on the other 
hand, the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) is putting forward the 
notion that although the tourism industry claims that there has been no environmental 
impact since the tourism activity begun several years ago, the real impact of this 
activity is not well known. To define which issues are to be taken care of by regulating 
tourism, it is important to define its impacts over the three holdings developed by the 
ATS, which are the environment, science, and peace (Harcha, 2006).  
 
To illustrate, Maher (2005) stated that it is possible to identify several common issues 
concerning the different types of tourism impact: 
● Physical damage to the landscape; 
● Interference with wildlife; 
● Introduction of foreign diseases into penguin colonies; 
● Marine pollution and the introduction of foreign marine organisms; 
● Safety issues. 
 
Considering that the objective of this research is to assess the actual environmental 
regulatory framework regarding increasing tourism activities in Antarctica, to 
understand the possible environmental impacts in Antarctica, it is possible to classify 
the potential impacts of shipping activities as follows (Maher, 2005): 
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● Damage to marine seabed communities due to repeated anchoring at the same 
position; 
● Fuel and oil spills; 
● Irregular sewage dumping and waste; 
● Noise from the ship and small-boat activities; 
● Interference with wildlife; 
● Pollution caused by ship engine emissions. 
 
As an example of marine pollution and environmental impacts due to tourism  
activities in Antarctica, on January 28, 1989 the Argentine Polar Transporter and 
Tourism Vessel Bahía Paraiso ran aground two miles from Palmer Station. The vessel 
was on route to resupply the Argentine stations in the vicinity and had called on Palmer 
Station to allow the tourists on board an opportunity to visit the scientific station. 
Another incident was the sinking of the M/V Explorer, which suffered a hull break 
while was sailing in an ice field on November 23, 2007 in the Bransfield Strait (Ford, 
2009). These two examples clearly demonstrate how the lack of experience sailing in 
Antarctic waters or an excess of confidence can cause irreversible damage to the 
fragile Antarctic ecosystem (Dalaklis & Ölçer, 2019). 
 
 
1.3 Research aims and objectives  
 
This research effort will assess the regulatory framework related to the environmental 
protection of the region by factorizing the increasing tourism activity in the Antarctica. 
The starting point will be to highlight the importance of keeping Antarctica pristine, 
and how the increase of human activities in that region will impact the environment. 
Furthermore, the objective of this research is to evaluate if the tourism vessels visiting 
Antarctica are increasing, and all the factors that jeopardize the operation in Antarctica 
like the limited help services needed in a critical situation. Moreover, to discuss how 
are the different controls that are carried out on the vessels that navigate these waters 
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and review some incidents that could have irreversibly affected the Antarctic 
environment. Finally, an attempt will be made to evaluate whether all of the measures 
taken to protect the Antarctic environment are sufficient or whether it would be 
advisable to introduce additional measures.  
 
 
1.4 Research questions 
 
Despite the various regulations previously mentioned, it seems difficult to identify an 
author that holds the view that the current system is appropriate. In addition, Maher 
(2005) puts forward the notion that “…there is no systematic and comprehensive legal 
regime in place to manage Antarctic tourism”. Furthermore, the same author believes 
that the purpose of the ATS regarding Antarctic tourism management is not clear or 
well understood, so he summarized a list of shortcomings of the current regulatory 
framework: 
● Lack of strategic overview; 
● Uncertain legal foundation; 
● Lack of management planning / comprehensive protected area network; 
● Flaws in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system; 
● Lack of monitoring; 
● Lack of a regulatory institution of tourism management. 
 
Although the Antarctic Treaty and Madrid Protocol have good intentions, the most 
challenging obstacle to adding to and updating the legislation over the years has been 
the consensus-based process required by the Treaty. Furthermore, each member of the 
ATS has their own ideas about how activities should be administered in Antarctica. 
Several proposals regarding tourism activities have been presented at ATS; however, 
very few measures have been adopted. In particular, the consensus around strategic 
policy directives specific to tourism has been very difficult. As such, new tourism 
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promotions have been developed in a purposely trend, the result being a divided 
regulatory framework for tourism activities in Antarctica (Butters, 2017). 
The research questions are: 
● How are the Antarctic tourism activities regulated? 
● What are the factors of the tourism activities that jeopardize the Antarctic 
environment? 
● Which is the IMO regulatory framework to cope with this issue? 
● Are these regulations enough to ensure safe operation?  
 
 
1.5 Research methodology and methods 
 
The primary research methodology for this dissertation will be a qualitative literature 
review of the issues regarding the tourism activity in Antarctica and how this activity 
can threaten the environment. A complete review of the respective regulatory systems 
(IMO, IAATO, Antarctic Treaty) will also be done. In addition, the research will 
identify the level of conformity by operators and determinate the effectiveness of the 
inspection realized by inspectors of member states of the ATS. Moreover, this research 
will evaluate the regulatory framework and try to determine if it is adequate (or not) 
to ensure safe operations in Antarctica.   
 
 
1.6 Anticipated outcomes 
 
It will be determine if the increasing tourism activities in Antarctica jeopardize the 
environment and wildlife, and if the actual regulatory system is enough to ensure 
effective pollution control in Antarctica or if it needs to be updated. Moreover, the 
analysis of reports could determine if the vessels operating in Antarctic waters can 
accomplish with the regulatory system. The information collected will be essential to 
understand the issue and determine further steps to achieve awareness about the 
environment in Antarctica. The analysis of past incidents will allow determining most 
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common reason and contributing factors. Then, by examining current regulations, 
legislations and guidelines, is intention to understand if the causes of accidents are 














2.1 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (The 
Madrid Protocol) 
 
In the previous Chapter, the Antarctic Treaty System and the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection have been discussed very briefly. In this Chapter, the 
principles of environmental protection under this protocol will be analyzed at a greater 
level of detail. The specific Protocol was signed in 1991 under the premise that the 
development of a comprehensive regime for the protection of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems is in the interest of mankind as 
a whole. In its Article 2 Objective and Designation, it is stated that the parties agree to 
appoint Antarctica as a “natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.”  
 
In addition, Article 3, Environmental Principles stipulates that  
 
the protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems and the intrinsic value of Antarctica, including its wilderness and 
aesthetic values and its value as an area for the conduct of scientific research, 
in particular research essential to understanding the global environment, shall 
be fundamental considerations in the planning and conduct of all activities in 
the Antarctic Treaty area,  
 
and into this activities is included the tourism activity. To achieve this, the Protocol 
encourage parties to regulate the activities in Antarctica in order to limit all the 
negative impacts to the environment and related ecosystems. Furthermore, the 
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activities shall be planned and conducted to avoid adverse effects on climate, air and 
water quality; changes in all the environments (atmospheric, terrestrial, glacial and 
marine); changes in the distributions patterns and population of flora and fauna, 
specially avoiding activities that could jeopardize all species; degradation or 
endangered of biological areas, and historic and scientific locations. 
 
One of the most important provisions set by this Protocol is the Article 14 Inspection, 
where it is stated that to comply with the provisions of this Protocol regarding the 
protection of the environment and associated ecosystems, the parties of the Antarctic 
Treaty shall arrange inspections to be made in accordance with the Article VII of the 
Antarctic Treaty considering that the quality assurance increase the level of safety. 
Although inspections alone cannot prevent accidents, then it is necessary to promote 
the safety culture.  In addition, this Article stipulates that the inspectors shall have 
access, within others, to all vessels discharging or embarking general cargo or 
personnel in Antarctica. Moreover, Article 14 of this Protocol also determines that the 
reports obtained from the inspections shall be sent to the parties whose vessels are 
covered. Regarding this Article, some examples of the inspections and results will be 
addressed later.  
 
The Protocol is also composed by six Annexes to complement the general provisions. 
A brief description of those Annexes follows next:  
  
ANNEX I: Environmental Impact Assessment 
Procedures and considerations regarding environmental assessment of the different 
activities in Antarctica. In order to determine if any activity in Antarctica has  some 
impact on the environment, an Initial Environmental Evaluation should  be conducted. 
If this Initial Environmental Evaluation shows that the activity is likely to have less 




ANNEX II: Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora 
Annex II states the necessity of a permit if any activity will interfere with Antarctic 
flora and fauna. It stipulates the manner to determine the protected species and 
includes the prohibition of the introduction of non-native species. In this annex it is 
important understand that the tourism activity without regulation could  result  in the 
introduction of micro-organisms like viruses, bacteria, yeasts and fungi every time that 
the passengers visit different locations. In addition, tourism vessels operating in 
Antarctic waters could “accidentally” discharge ballast waters which could contain 
aquatic micro-organism or larvae that will affect the ecosystem equilibrium. 
 
ANNEX III: Waste Disposal and Waste Management 
Annex III establishes the necessity to develop waste management plans to be carried 
out by the parties operating in the Antarctic Treaty Area. In addition, this annex 
indicates the requirements to manage actual and historic waste, and the removal and 
clean-up of the installations.   
 
ANNEX IV: Prevention of Marine Pollution 
This annex regulates the discharge of oil or oil mixture according to Annex I of 
MARPOL 73/78; discharge of noxious liquid substances, sewage and plastics. 
Moreover, it stipulates the necessity for preventive measures and the development of 
an emergency preparedness and response plan to deal with accidental spills.  
 
ANNEX V: Area Protection and Management 
This annex establishes the level of protection of Specially Protected Areas, Antarctic 
Specially Managed Areas, and Antarctic Specially Managed Areas and Historic Sites 
and Monuments.  
 
ANNEX VI: Liability Arising from Environmental Emergencies 
In this annex, the Protocol establishes the necessity of preventative measures to reduce 
the risk of environmental contingencies, which may include specialized structures or 
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equipment of means of transportation, specialized procedures into the operation of the 
transportation, and specialized training of personnel. Furthermore, each Party 
operating in Antarctica should  establish contingency plans for responses to incidents 
which could affect the environment and the ecosystems. This contingency plan should 
include: 
(a) Procedures for conducting an assessment of the nature of the incident; 
(b) Notification procedures; 
(c) Identification and mobilization of resources; 
(d) Response plan; 
(e) Training; 
(f) Record keeping; and 
(g) Demobilization. 
 
This Annex also includes the response action to be adopted by Parties operating in the 
Antarctic region to take prompt and effective response action to environmental 
emergencies derived from the operation. In addition, Article 6 of this Annex states that 
an operator that fails to take prompt and effective response action to environmental 
emergencies derived from its activities, shall be liable to pay the costs of response 
action taken by Parties pursuant to Article 5(2) of this Annex to such Parties. This 
means that the Party whose operator is involved in an environmental incident and do 
not have a prompt and effective response, has to  pay the amount of money to cover 
the costs of the contingency response to the third Party that deals with the incident. 
However, Article 8 states that a Party shall be exempted from liability if it proves that 
the environmental incident was caused by actions related to safe human life or safety, 
or due to a natural disaster, where it was not possible the take preventive actions to 
reduce the risk of environmental impact. Article 9 states the limits of liability 
according to the tonnage of the vessels, and encourages  the Parties operators to 
maintain an adequate insurance or other financial security to cover the liability (Article 
11).          
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An example is the wreckage of the Argentine M/V A.R.A. Bahía Paraiso, which run a 
grounded in January 1989 resulting in a spill of 600.000 liters of fuel and lubricants 
into the water. This incident was before to this Protocol, and the cleaning process was 
started by the Governments of the United States and Argentina because their nearest 
base, Palmer Station, and the nearest ecosystem was affected, but without a complete 
success. On the positive side, after the signature of this Protocol (1991), the 
governments of the Argentina and the Netherlands signed on February 1992 a 
Memorandum of Understanding where both governments started a joint effort to clean 
and remove all the oil remaining inside the vessel (Ford, 2009).    
 
 
2.2 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships (MARPOL) 
 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted on 2 November 1973 this 
convention to cover the prevention of pollution of the marine environment by vessels 
from operational or accidental causes. Regarding the topic, in Resolution MEPC.42 
(30) adopted by the Marine Environment Protection Committee on 16 November 
1990, the Committee stipulates the designation of Antarctic area as special area under 
Annexes I and V of MARPOL 73/78. This Convention, unlike the Antarctic Treaty 
and the Madrid Protocol, is mandatory for all the Member States of the IMO, which 
could be or not signatories of the Antarctic Treaty.  
 
This Protocol, in Annex I Regulation 10, Methods for the prevention of oil pollution 
from ships while operating in special areas states that specially in the Antarctic area, 
any discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixture from any vessels shall be prohibited. 
In addition,  it stipulates that no “discharge into the sea shall contain chemicals or other 
substances in quantities or concentrations which are hazardous to the marine 
environment or chemicals or other substances introduced for the purpose of 
circumventing the conditions of discharge specified in this regulation.”  
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Annex II of this Convention Regulations for the Control of Pollution by Noxious 
Liquid Substances in Bulk and Unified Interpretations of Annex II in Regulation 5 
states that into the Antarctic area the discharge of noxious liquid substances or 
mixtures containing such substances is strictly prohibited. In addition, under 
Regulation 8 – Measures of control, the government of each Party to the convention 
shall authorize surveyors for the purpose of the implementation of this regulation. This 
is important to be regulated by the Parties carrying inspections to the vessels operating 
in Antarctica. 
 
Another important issue regarding tourism activities in Antarctica is the garbage 
production and the pollution related with this problem. To cope with this problem 
MARPOL stipulates in the Annex V – Regulations for the Prevention of Pollution by 
Garbage from Ships that the disposal into the sea of all plastics including but not 
limited to synthetic ropes, synthetic fishing nets, plastic garbage bags and incinerator 
ashes from plastic products which may contain toxic or heavy metal residues; and all 
other garbage, including paper products, rags, glass, metal, bottles, crockery, dunnage, 
lining and packing materials is forbidden.  
 
MARPOL is one of the most important IMO document to deal with the issue of the 
environmental impact of the vessels operating in Antarctica, particularly regarding the 
discharge of oil and oily waters, and  garbage. Considering the extensive provision of 
this convention, the specific legal intervention has a very positive contribution 
regarding the issue of Antarctic environment protection. 
 
 
2.3 The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (POLAR 
CODE) 
 
This Code is another instrument established by IMO to regulate the different issues 
that could endangerer the Antarctic environment. While MARPOL regulates how to 
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prevent water pollution from oil, hazardous discharges and garbage derived from 
vessel operations in special areas, the Polar Code was developed to provide tools to 
ensure safe vessel operations and the protection of the polar environment. However, 
in the Part II-A Pollution Prevention Measures, this Code states operational and 
structural requirements for the vessels operating in polar waters divided in Chapter 1-
Prevention of pollution by oil; Chapter 2- Control of pollution by noxious liquid 
substances in bulk; and Chapter 4-Precention of pollution by sewage from ships. In 
addition, the pollution measures stated in this Code are complementary with those 
stated by the MARPOL regulations, with the difference that this Code regarding 
pollution prevention stipulates specific measures for vessel categories and the different 
ice concentration areas. 
 
The Polar Code identifies several issues related to  the navigation in polar waters that 
could jeopardize the safety of the operations such as: 
1. Ice concentration that could affect the structure, mechanical and navigation 
systems, safety. 
2. Topside icing that could affect stability, mechanical equipment exposed to ice, 
safety operations. 
3. Low temperature conditions that could affect the human working environment 
without proper equipment, mechanical equipment, safety. 
4. An accentuated difference between daylight and darkness hours depending on 
the season an latitude that could affect the human performance and 
navigational features. 
5. High latitudes affect navigation system, communication and information 
reception, GPS reception, wellbeing communication. 
6. Lack of hydrographic information and nautical chart accuracy due to poor 
navigation information to generate upgrades with “notice to mariners.” 
Remoteness and lack of information jeopardize the operations and increase the 
possibility of grounding, with the addition of the limited SAR response to reach 
the area. 
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7. Operations in polar waters require crew experience, being this issue a potential 
factor for human error. 
8. Operations in extreme conditions need optimum emergency response 
equipment, where the remoteness could affect the possibility of replacing and 
recharging the equipment after its  use. 
9. Polar operations are exposed to severe, extreme and rapidly changing weather 
conditions, thus affecting the risk level. 
10. Operating in environment protected areas, special attention for the crew is 
needed in order to comply with the international regulation.     
 
This Polar Code states mandatory provisions covering safety measures in the part I-A 
and pollution prevention measures in the part II-A which apply to new ships built after 
1 January 2017. However, vessels built before this date are also required to achieve 
the relevant requirements of this code in order to comply with the regulation. 
 
Regarding safety provisions, the Polar Code stipulates the following: 
 
Equipment 
 Windows on bridge must be able to bear with melted ice, freezing rain, snow, 
mist, spray and condensation. 
 All lifeboats shall be partially or totally enclosed type. 
 All the crew are required to have adequate thermal protective clothes. 
Moreover, on passenger vessels an immersion suit or a thermal protective aid 
for each one is required. 
 Special equipment for ice removal like electrical and pneumatic devices, 
special tools like axes or wooden clubs are required. 
 Regarding firefighting safety, extinguishing equipment operable in cold 
temperatures, should be protected from ice, be suitable for persons wearing 
bulky and cumbersome cold weather gear.. 
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Design & Construction 
 This Code states three categories of vessels which may operate in polar 
waters, based on: 
Category A: vessels designed to operate in polar waters in at least medium 
first-year ice that may include old ice. 
Category B: vessels not included in Category A, designed to operate in polar 
waters in at least thin first-year ice that may include old ice incorporation. 
Category C: Vessels designed for open waters or ice conditions less severe 
than stipulated in categories A and B.  
 In order to comply with this code, vessels must assure sufficient stability in 
intact condition when subject to ice accreditation and the stability calculations 
must take into account the icing allowance.  
 Vessels intended to operate in low air temperature must be constructed with 
materials suitable for operation at the ships polar service temperature. 
 In ice strengthened vessels, the structure of the ship must be able to resist both 
global and local structural loads. 
 
Operations & Manning 
 All vessels operating in polar waters must have navigation aids to receive 
information about ice conditions.  
 This Code requires training and certification of bridge watchkeeping officers 
and senior officers, according to  the regulations of the STCW Code as 
amended. In the case of passenger vessels, the Polar Code requires for open-
waters including ice operations a basic training for Masters, chief mate and 
officers in charge of a navigational watch; and for other-waters including ice 
an advanced training for Master and chief mate, and basic training for officers 
in charge of a navigational watch. Regarding certification, this Code requires 
that the vessels operating in polar waters should have the Polar Ship 
Certificate (PSC) which is issued by their administration and must contain 
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information about vessel characteristics, ice classification, and operational 
limitations for ice conditions, temperature and maximum latitude. 
 Another provision of this Code is the Polar Waters Operational Manual 
(PWOM), which provides the operator and crew members information 
regarding vessel capabilities and limitations in order to assist the operation in 
polar waters. This manual must include: 
1. Ship-specific capabilities or limitations 
2. Specific procedures for normal operations or to avoid exceeding ship 
capabilities 
3. Specific procedures to deal with incidents 
4. Voyage planning to avoid ice or cold temperatures 
5. Ice information reception arrangements 
6. Awareness of and means to deal with lack of or limitations in 
hydrographic, meteorological and navigational information 
7. Special measures for equipment maintenance and operation in low 
temperatures, prevention and mitigation of icing while operating in 
sea ice. 
 
Regarding pollution prevention measures the Polar Code states: 
Oil 
 Discharge into the sea of oil or oily mixtures from any vessel is prohibited. 
 Double hull and double bottom are required for all oil tankers including those 
less than 5,000 DWT. 
 The use of heavy fuel is banned in the Antarctic area and vessels are 
encouraged not to use or carry heavy fuel oil in the Arctic area. 
 Vessels should consider using non-toxic biodegradable lubricants or water-
based system in lubricated components outside the underwater hull with 





 This Code provides measures to be taken to minimize the risk of invasive 
aquatic species through vessels’ ballast water and biofouling. 
 
Sewage 
 The discharge of sewage in polar waters is prohibited, except under specific 
circumstances. Sewage not comminuted or disinfected can be discharged at a 
distance of more than 12 NM from any ice shelf or fast ice. Comminuted and 
disinfected sewage can be discharged more than 3 NM from any ice shelf or 
fast ice.  
 Sewage discharge is permitted if the vessel has an approved sewage treatment 
plant, and discharges treated sewage as far as practicable from the nearest 
land, any fast ice, ice shelf, or areas of specified ice concentration. 
 
Garbage 
 Regarding plastics this Code prohibits all disposal. 
 Discharge of food wastes onto the ice is prohibited. However, food wastes 
which have been comminuted or ground, no greater than 25 mm, can be 
discharged only when vessel is not less than 12 NM from the nearest land, 
nearest ice shelf, or nearest fast ice. 
 The discharge of animal carcasses is strictly forbidden. 
 Cargo residues, cleaning agents or additives in cold washing water may only 
be discharged if they are not harmful to the marine environment; both 
departure and destination ports are within Arctic waters; and there are no 
adequate reception facilities at those ports. The same requirements apply to 
the Antarctic area under MARPOL regulations.  
Chemicals 
 Discharge of noxious liquid substances (NLS) or mixtures containing noxious 
liquid substances is prohibited in polar waters. 
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As it is possible to identify, the pollution prevention measures set by this Code are 
complementary to those provisions stipulated by the MARPOL. Besides, part I-A of 
the Polar Code is very important to plan navigation and operations in polar waters due 
to the extreme conditions in which the operations will be carried out.  
 
Regarding the issue of safe operations in polar waters, it is important understand the 
conditions and factors that could endangered the navigation and influence upon the 
conduce of operation. Although navigating in polar waters will not suppose  navigation 
in  heavy traffic areas, there are other important aspects that could make the operations 
difficult, which is lack of traffic, the condition that generates insufficient navigational 
aids to operate in polar waters. Moreover, the extreme weather conditions will generate 
several issues on the sailing conditions. Due to the lack of traffic in polar waters and 
more specifically in the Antarctic area, where the traffic is only related to tourism, 
research operations and logistic operations, one issue that could jeopardize the 
operations is the different type of nautical charts necessary to operate in the area. As 
an example, in Antarctica it is possible and necessary to use nautical charts from 
different countries, which are supposed be familiar with the different projections and 
units. While some countries uses Mercator projections, others use Lambert Conformal 
projections.  
 
Moreover, some countries use fathoms to express the depth  and others use meters. 
This means  an extra attention demand from the navigation officer and the Master 
during the voyage planning because several times it is necessary use different charts 
across the conduct of the journey. Another important piece of information is to pay 
attention to the datum of the chart because some paper charts do not have WGS84 
datum, which is necessary to fix the position with GPS and demand the introduction 
of corrections the GPS fix in order to obtain an accurate position. Another chart issue, 
particularly in Antarctica, is the lack of depth information and soundings. It is normal 
to see in many charts several track lines of soundings where the vessels normally 
follow to navigate (Snider, 2018).  
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The easy determination of the course to follow while navigating in polar regions is 
also affected. It is well known that magnetic compasses are useless in polar regions 
due to the proximity to the magnetic pole. In addition, the gyrocompass is also affected 
by the high latitude; corrective actions are need while the vessel is increasing the 
latitude. This issue is presented not only in the traditional gyrocompass models, but 
also in the modern fiber-optic equipment (Snider, 2018). 
 
Furthermore, one of the most important navigation aids used to navigate in polar 
waters is the RADAR. Performance of this system is also affected by the conditions in 
the area, particularly by the low temperature. The extreme temperature conditions 
affect the RADAR performance generating changes in the shape of the beam with the 
consequent return lost. Another important factor is the correct use of the RADAR tools 
like gain, sea and rain clutters. Training drills and simulator runs can fix this issue. It 
is indispensable that the watch officer should know how to use the RADAR aid to the 
perfect detection and identification of the ice present at sea, and on the coast line 
(Snider, 2018). 
 
Operating a vessel in extreme conditions does not only increase attention at the bridge 
but also in the engine room and at the deck operations. Normally, operating in ice 
conditions, the bridge watch should be enhanced with the presence of another officer 
to support the watch. The premise is to add as many visual lookouts as possible in 
order to assure maximum coverage of  all the navigation aids and the sea. In addition, 
the bridge watch should have clear statements when to call the Master and should 
include the first sighting ice, ice or weather conditions changing unexpectedly, risk or 
occurrence of icing, vessel encounters any condition not expected, and when visibility 
becomes reduced, among others.  
In addition, engine room watch should also be prepare for the navigation in polar 
waters due to the necessity of prompter response when the bridge needs it. Moreover, 
the engine watch should  be prepared to respond to  any alarm that could appear for 
fire or for collision with ice. Regular revisions of the deck operating system should be 
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carried out  because in extreme temperatures the icing will affect systems like anchor 
maneuver, firefighting equipment and lifesaving equipment. Therefore, deck watches 
should be increased to be able to observe any unusual conditions to be informed to the 
bridge officer. In addition, it is important to be sure that the deck watch has the 
appropriate clothes and should be supervised every time while the crew is outside 
(Snider, 2018).   
 
Upon completion of the discussion of navigating in Antarctica, the following will shift 
toward past accidents in the region. The reason for doing this is identify most common 
causes of accidents to understand the importance of the safety operations in Antarctica, 
a list of vessels incidents will be examined. According to the Antarctic and Southern 
Ocean Coalition (ASOC) (2019) the following is a list of vessel incidents registered in 
the Antarctica and southern oceans: 
 
M/V “NELLA DAN” 
 
This was an Australian research vessel built in 1961 in accordance with the Australian 
Antarctic Division, she had the capacity for 42 passengers with 75.5 meters in length 
and 14.3 meters in breadth. The vessel had and ice breaker stern, ice fins and ice knife, 
with double hull in the engine room and holds. In December 1987 bad weather blew 
up during resupply operations at Macquarie Island. The vessel dragged anchor and was 
driven aground over the island, the hull was holed in several places and sea water 
flooded the engine room. There were no casualties or injures to the crew or researchers. 
Although initial plans were put forward to save the vessel, due to the prevailing 





Figure 2.1 M/V “Nella Dan” ran aground at Macquarie Island in December 1987. 
Retrieved from www.antarctica.gov.au 
 
 
M/V “BAHIA PARAISO” 
 
This was an Argentinian polar vessel used for tourism and research purposes. It was 
built in Argentina in July 1980 with a length of 132.70 meters, a breadth of 19.60 
meters and a draught of 9.70 meters; with capacity for 124 crew members and 82 
passengers. On 28 January 1989, the vessel ran aground in front of Ambers Island at 
Arthur Harbor, Antarctic peninsula, close to the United States Station Palmer due to 
human error. The disaster resulted in the spill of 510 tons of diesel oil affecting the 
birds and marine ecosystem in the area, being one of the worst environmental disaster 
that occurred in Antarctica. The National Science Foundation organized an emergency 
spill response team composed of experts from the U.S. Navy, NOAA, the U.S. Coast 
Guard and private contractors. In 1993 the operation to recover the oil remaining inside 
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the fuel tanks of the vessel was carried out successfully. The vessel sunk in the position 




Figure 2.2 M/V “Bahia Paraiso” ran aground at Arthur Harbor on December 1989. 
Retrieved from www.histarmar.com.ar 
 
 
M/V “LYUBOV ORLOVA” 
 
This was a Russian Antarctic cruise vessel built in 1975 with a length of 4,251 GT, 90 
meters , a beam of 16 meters and a draught of 4.6 meters; and it was built to ice class 
1A to resist impacts with ice. The vessel ran aground on 27 November 2006 at 
Deception Island, South Shetlands Islands. The Master called for help and the R/V 
“Las Palmas” from the Spanish Navy assisted the vessel. After an evaluation, the 
Master decided to wait until next high tide to gain floatage due to no hull wreck was 
noted. The R/V “Las Palmas” towed the M/V “Lyubov Orlova” to deeper waters and 
the cruise vessel returned to navigate under its own propulsion to Argentina. No 





Figure 2.3 M/V “Lyubov Orlova” ran aground at Deception Island on 27 November 





This vessels was a Norwegian cruise ship built in 1997, with 11,386 GT, a length of 
123.30 meters, a beam of 19.50 meters and  a draught of 4.90 meters; with capacity 
for 460 passengers. The vessel was classified for light ice conditions, and ran aground 
on  29 January 2007 at Port Foster, Deception Island, South Shetland Islands due to 
several weather conditions. No casualties and minor hull damage were reported; 
however, scientists from the Spanish base Gabriel de Castilla in Deception Island 
reported traces of oil detected after the incident. The owner, Norway’s Hurtigruten 
Group, denied the existence of oil spill due to the fact that the double hull was not 
broken. The M/V “Nordkapp” was assisted by her sister cruise vessel M/V 
“Nordnorge” to transfer all the passengers, and continue their navigation to the 
continent. 




Figure 2.4 M/V “Nordkapp” ran aground at Deception Island on 27 January 2007. 





This was a passenger vessel built in Finland in 1969, with Monrovia as a Port of 
Registry. The M/V “Explorer” was classed by DNV as 1A1 to operate in polar waters. 
The vessel was 76.2 meters in length, 14 meters in beam, 5.6 meters in draught, with 
capacity for 100 passengers, and was operated by Great Adventure People (GAP) of 
Canada. On 23 November 2007 the vessel suffered a hull break while sailing in an ice 
field. The Master decided to enter the ice field because he believed that the vessel 
would  not suffer any damage; however, the ice pilot who made the assessment of the 
passenger video during the investigation stated that the ice was thicker and harder than 
the Master’s evaluation. Human error generated that the Explorer sunk in a position 
25 NM southeast of Penguin Island, Bransfield Strait near South Shetland Islands. 
After the evacuation, all passengers and crew members were rescued by the Norwegian 
M/V “Nordnorge”. The vessel was carrying 210 m3 of oils, lubricants and petrol; 
however, no spills were detected around the vessel, and there was no evidence of 
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pollution to the ecosystem. There were no casualties during the incident and the rescue 
operations (Ford, 2008). 
 
 






This was a steel hulled and ice-strengthened vessel built in 1970 and operated by 
Antarppy Expeditions. She had a length of 85 meters, a beam of 15.5 meters, a draught 
of 5.5 meters, and with capacity for 84 passengers and 38 crew members. On 4 
December of 2008 the vessel ran aground at Wilhelmina Bay, Gerlache Strait due to 
severe weather conditions. The M/V “Ushuaia” reported serious hull damage and 
diesel oil leak from the breached tanks, and was assisted by a United Kingdom Coast 
Guard vessel, the Russian icebreaker Grigoriy Mikheev, and the Chilean Navy vessels 
“Achiles” and “Lautaro”. On December 8 the vessel was refloated and continued 
sailing under its own propulsion to the continent. No casualties were reported, and the 




Figure 2.6 M/V “Ushuaia” ran aground at Wilhelmina Bay, Gerlache Strait on 04 
December 2008. Retrieved from www.gcaptain.com 
 
 
M/V “OCEAN NOVA” 
 
This was a passenger vessel built in 1992 with ice-strengthened hull and operated by 
Quark Expeditions, with a length of 72.8 meters, a width of 10.99 meters ,  a draft of 
3.40 meters, and with capacity for 98 passengers and 34 crew members. M/V “Ocean 
Nova” ran aground on 17 February 2009 in Marguerite Bay, close to Argentine 
research station San Martin, due to rough sea and adverse weather conditions. The M/V 
“Clipper Adventure” assisted the M/V “Ocean Nova” during passenger evacuation, 
without casualties or hull damage registered. Several hours later the vessel was freed 
and started the return sailing to the continent escorted by the M/V “Clipper 





Figure 2.7 M/V “Ocean Nova” ran aground at Marguerite Bay on 17 February 2009. 
Retrieved from www.komar.org 
 
 
M/V “POLAR STAR” 
 
This was a cruise vessel built in 1969 in Finland as a Class Ice 1A and double hull 
according to DNV classification; with a length of 86.5 meters, a beam of 21.2 meters, 
a draft of 6.2 meters and 3,500 GRT. With  a capacity to accommodate 80 passengers 
and 35 crew members, it was operated by Polar Star Expeditions Company. On 31 
January 2011, M/V “Polar Star” hit an unchartered rock during anchoring maneuvers  
north of Detaille Island damaging the outer hull. This is an example of how the low 
quality of charts affected the operations safety. An underwater survey showed several 
hull damages and decided to transfer all the passengers to another vessel and return to 





Figure 2.8 M/V “Polar Star” hit an unchartered rock at Detaille Island on 31 January 
2011. Retrieved from www.cruiselawnews.com 
 
 
M/V “MAR SEM FIM” 
 
This was a yacht owned by a famed Brazilian journalist and entrepreneur who was 
filming in Antarctica with four other crew members. The vessel was shipwrecked in 
Maxwell Bay, Ardley Cove on 7 April 2012 due to severe weather conditions and ice 
compression. The crew made a distress call and were rescued by the Chilean Navy in 
the Bahia Fildes Base. The vessel sunk and stayed 30 feet underwater until early 2013 






Figure 2.9 M/V “Mar Sem Fim” sunk at Maxwell Bay, Ardley Cove on 07 April 2012. 
Retrieved from www.amusingplanet.com 
 
As a summary of the incidents with vessels realizing tourism activities in Antarctica, 
the following  Table 1 shows a  summary  of dates, causes, location and consequences. 
 
Table 1 Summary of Details 
VESSEL NAME DATE LOCATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCES 




Ran aground over 
the island  
No casualties or 
environmental impact. The 
vessel was sunk in deep 
waters after the rescue 
Bahia Paraiso 28/01/89 
Arthur Harbor,  
Ambers Island 
Ran aground due to 
overconfidence 
No casualties. 510 Tons of 
diesel oil spilled. The vessel 
sunk at the incident location 
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Lyubov Orlova 27/11/2006 Deception Island Ran aground 
No casualties or 
environmental impact. The 
vessel continues under their 
own propulsion after high tide 
Nordkapp 29/01/2007 Deception Island 
Ran aground due 
severe weather 
conditions 
No casualties and minor hull 
damage reported. The 
shipowner denied oil spill 
despite that local scientist 
discovered traces of oil after 
the sinister. The vessel 
continues under their own 
propulsion  
Explorer 23/11/2007 Bransfield Strait 
Hull break while 
was sailing in ice 
field due to an 
incorrect Master’s 
ice field evaluation.
The vessel sunk after 
passenger evacuation. No 
casualties or environmental 
damage.  
Ushuaia 04/12/2008 Gerlache Strait 
Ran aground due to 
severe weather 
conditions 
No casualties but serious hull 
damage and diesel oil leak. 
The vessel continue with their 
own propulsion after 
evacuation.   
Ocean Nova 17/02/2009 Marguerite Bay 
Ran aground due to 
rough sea and 
adverse weather 
conditions 
No casualties or hull damage. 
The vessel continues sailing 
under own propulsion  
Polar Star 31/01/2011 Detaille Island 




No casualties or 
environmental impact. 
Several outer hull damages. 
The vessel continues sailing 
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under own propulsion after 
evacuation  
Mar Sem Fim 07/04/2012 Maxwell Bay 




No casualties or 
environmental impact. The 
vessel was refloated after a 
year.  
   
As it is possible to identify, the most common accident cause is vessels grounding (7 
of 9). On the other hand, sinking events occurred only in 3 cases and fortunately there 
were no human casualties. In addition, it is notorious how the assistance provided by 
other vessels and stations helped to create a quick response avoiding major danger to 
the crew, passengers and the environment. Regarding environmental impact, the most 
significative was the M/V “Bahia Paraiso” which demonstrated that the containment 
and cleaning process after an oil spill incident is very difficult to be developed due to 
the severe operational conditions. Despite that the human error was present in this 
incident, actually the polar operations are influenced by the Polar Code.   
     
 
2.4 The International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) 
 
In addition to the details provided in Chapter 1, IAATO provides a forum for Antarctic 
tourism stakeholders to work together and develop the highest standards and best 
practices management to reach the best protection of the Antarctic environment, 
ensure safe operations and avoid accidents.  
 
The objectives and mission of IAATO are very clear regarding the regulation of 
tourism activities in Antarctica, with the clear statement of the environment 
protection as a premise. To assure an optimum tourism activity control, the 
association should apply the international regulations like SOLAS, MARPOL, the 
Polar Code, among  others. However, if an operator is not a member of the IAATO, 
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this does not mean that the operator is exempt to comply with the international 
regulations. Currently, IAATO have 47 touristic operators registered as members, 
and with the provisional operators and associates parties, the membership directory 
arise to more than 100 companies. Regarding member vessels associated to IAATO 
during 2019, the association counted 87 vessels divided into four different 
categories:  
 C1: Category 1 (vessels between 13-200 passengers); 
 C2: Category 2 (vessels between 201-500 passengers); 
 CR: Cruise only (vessels 500+ passengers); 
 YA: Yachts (up to 12 passengers). 
For all those operators who are members, IAATO (2019) states the next obligations 
for operations in Antarctica: 
1. Provide prior notification of, and reports on, their activities to the 
competent authorities of the appropriate Party or Parties; 
2. Conduct an assessment of the potential environmental impacts of their 
planned activities; 
3. Provide for effective response to environmental emergencies, especially 
with regard to marine pollution; 
4. Ensure self-sufficiency and safe operations; 
5. Respect scientific research and the Antarctic environment, including 
restrictions regarding protected areas, and the protection of flora and 
fauna; 
6. Prevent the disposal and discharge of prohibited waste. 
 
All these obligations are set in accordance with the international regulations 
regarding environmental protection in protected areas. In addition, the 
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Administration set special visitors guidelines to be followed for the operators and 
visitors: 
1. Guidelines for Visitors to the Antarctic: adopted in 2011 by Treaty 
Parties at the Antarctic Consultative Meeting (ATCM XXXIV, Buenos 
Aires, Argentina). (Appendix A) 
2. Visitor Guidelines Recommendation XVIII-1: adopted in 1994 at the 
Antarctic Treaty Meeting at Kyoto, Japan. (Appendix B) 
3. Clean Seas Guidelines: adopted on 3 May 2019 in the annual meeting 
realized in Cape Town, South Africa. These new guidelines introduce 
new regulations to reduce plastic use and waste of the vessels during 
Antarctic operations. (Appendix C) 
Regarding plastic and waste contamination in Antarctica, during the XLII Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting celebrated in Prague, Czech Republic on 31 May 2019, 
the IAATO and the Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO) got  
engaged in reducing single-use plastics and waste generated by polar tourism 
presenting the new guideline for visitors called “Reducing Waste – Guidelines for 
Visitors to the Antarctic” with the purpose to share information between 
organizations and help to reduce the use of plastics in Antarctica. The program was 
agreed between IAATO and AECO includes: 
 
 Auditing ongoing efforts, interest and willingness to develop further; 
 Sharing ideas, innovation, best practices and experiences with the wider 
polar communities. This includes IAATO joining the Scientific 
Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) Action Group on plastics; 
 Developing appropriate guidelines for target audiences in multiple 
languages; 
 Continuing to supporting research into understanding the effects and 
impacts of plastic pollution; 
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 Motivating enhanced industry involvement in marine debris removal 
efforts. IAATO will formally participate in the CCAMLR Marine Debris 
Programme, commencing in the 2019-2020 season; 
 Developing a joint communications strategy to raise awareness and inform 
about IAATO and AECO efforts and inspire others to follow suit; 
 Developing an IAATO environmental policy for greening offices and 
meetings that will include a brief to send to potential meeting venues and 




In the present Chapter, various regulatory instruments have  been addressed. Firstly, 
as the first regulatory framework regarding operation in Antarctica, the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection (The Madrid Protocol) was presented. This Protocol, was 
signed by the member states of the Antarctic Treaty in 1991 with the objective of 
the development a regulatory framework for the protection of the Antarctic 
environment and its associated ecosystems. It is important to understand that this 
Protocol is intended to be accomplished by the Member States signatories of the 
Antarctic Treaty only, for all the operations in Antarctica, including tourism activity. 
One of the most important provision of this Protocol is the inspection system 
established by Article 14, whereby inspectors shall have access to all vessels 
operating in Antarctica like passengers vessels. In summary, the Protocol states the 
importance of an environmental impact assessment, marine pollution prevention and 
waste management, protection areas, and the liability derived from eventual 
environmental emergencies. Although this protocol is mandatory for member states 
only who comply with all the regulations, the inspections executed and analyzed in 
the next chapter will demonstrate the high level of compliance.   
 40
On the other hand, two important instruments developed by the IMO and analyzed 
in this section were the MARPOL and the Polar Code. The first one, MARPOL, 
which was adopted on 1973 is intended to prevent the pollution of the marine 
environment derived from vessels operations or accidental causes. Despite the fact 
that MARPOL is mandatory for all IMO member states’ vessels, to prevent the 
pollution in general, the MEPC.42 adopted and designated in 1990 (one year before 
the adoption of the Madrid Protocol) the Antarctic area as special area under 
MARPOL. This protocol states the methods to prevent the oil, waste, and noxious 
substances pollution derived from vessel operations in the special areas. Moreover, 
the Madrid Protocol in its Annex IV - Prevention of Marine Pollution uses as basis 
the Annex I of MARPOL to regulate the discharge of oil, sewage, plastics and 
noxious substances from vessel operations in Antarctica. However, it is important 
to evaluate the necessity to incorporate regulations regarding the number of drills to 
enhance the ability to respond to an oil spill incident.  
Regarding safety operations in polar waters, the IMO instrument, the Polar Code 
entered into force on 2017 to protect vessels, crew and passengers in severe 
conditions of the waters surrounding both poles. This Code stipulates different 
issues related to the navigation in polar waters and states safety provisions regarding 
equipment, vessels construction, vessels operation and manning. In addition, this 
Code is complementary to the provisions stated by MARPOL regarding oil, invasive 
species, sewage, garbage and chemicals pollution. Moreover, in the chapter many 
different issues were described that could jeopardize the operations in polar waters. 
As examples of the importance to ensure safe operations in Antarctica, between 
1987 and 2012, nine incidents with passenger vessels were registered, of which three 
ended sunk with different environmental impacts. Another important aspect of this 
instrument is the manning and training. This matter is addressed in chapter 12 were 
the code states that every crew member shall be familiarized with all the 
requirements of the Polar Water Operational Manual (PWOM). However, the 
mentioned chapter only applies for Masters and Officers, whereby PWOM must be 
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used by all the crew. This training should include medical issues to deal with the 
Antarctic environment (Karahalil & Özsoy, 2018). In addition, another issue arising 
from Antarctic navigation is the SAR operations. Due to several weather and ice 
conditions, a rescue operation in Antarctica could be difficult and probably 
unsuccessful. Unlike in the North Pole where the Arctic Search and Rescue 
Agreement deal with SAR operations without jurisdiction interference, in the 
Antarctica few navy vessels (from Argentina and Chile) operate as SAR vessels, in 
the Antarctic peninsula during summer season. Moreover, simulators are far from 
replicate the operation conditions in Antarctica, making the navigation experience 
indispensable for the Master and crew to operate in safe conditions (Dalaklis & 
Baxevani, 2018) .              
With respect to the tourism activities specifically, in 1991 (after that the Madrid 
Protocol entered into force) some Antarctic tour operators created the IAATO to 
advocate, promote and practice environmentally responsible operations from the 
private-sector tourism operators. Currently, more than 100 tourism operators from 
different countries are members of the IAATO, which increases the number of 
monitoring systems in order to comply with the international regulations.  
Considering that the mayor environmental impact regarding vessel incidents in 
Antarctica was in 1989 (M/V Bahia Paraiso), the provisions stated by the Madrid 
Protocol, MARPOL, Polar Code and IAATO show that the regulations had a 
positive impact on the operations assuring best-practices to protect the environment. 
However, the incidents that occurred between 2006 and 2011 demonstrated that the 
importance to ensure safe operations in Antarctica is essential due to the severe 
operations conditions. In addition, the Polar Code is intended to cope with the issue 











In this Chapter, the main aim of the research is to analyze the results of the inspections 
carried out by the Parties of the Antarctic Treaty to ensure that all the provisions and 
objectives of the Treaty are attained. These inspections are realized under Article VII 
of the Antarctic Treaty and Article 14 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to 
vessels operating in Antarctica. The first inspection report is from the season 1966-
1967 and the last one is from the season 2014-2015. It is important understand that 
these reports present information regarding inspections of installations, facilities, 
protected areas and vessels involved in the Antarctic activities which occur annually. 
However, for the purpose of this research only the inspections of  the tourism vessels 




3.2 Antarctic Treaty Inspections Programme Reports 
 
Season 1966-1967 
   
Inspections were conducted by United States Observers designated by the Secretary 
of State with the intention to promote the objectives and to assure the observance of 
the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty. Regarding vessel operations, the inspectors 
visited the M/V “Thala Dan”, a cargo vessel chartered by the Antarctic Division, 
Department of External Affairs, Melbourne, Australia, and she carried general cargo 
to the Wilkes Station. The vessel was commercially configured and unarmed. As a 
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conclusion of the report, there was no evidence of any violation of the provisions 
stipulated by the Antarctic Treaty. In addition, the observers stated that all activities 





This report was realized by the Chilean Antarctic Institute on behalf of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to certify the provisions stated in Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Chile sent two observers to different Antarctic bases and two vessels operating in the 
area.  
 
The first vessel inspected was the M/V “Professor Besnard” whose purpose was 
biological, oceanographic and fishery research. She belonged to the Sao Paulo 
University – Brazil, and had  been developing this research in Antarctic before. As a 
result of the inspection, the observers determined that the vessels only had capacity to 
develop scientific projects and research activities, without capacity of commercial 
fishery activities. In addition, the vessel was unarmed and used for peaceful purposes. 
Finally, no violations to the Antarctic Treaty were reported. 
 
The second vessel inspected was the M/V “Nuevo Alcocer”, a Spanish fishing 
prospecting vessel and specifically about krill. The vessel belonged to the Secretary of 
Fishery, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Food from Spain. The observers 
found elaborated and frozen krill from the fishery activity in Antarctica. However, no 
scientific equipment was visualized on board. As a conclusion, the activities carried 
out by the vessel were developed under the provisions stipulated by the Antarctic 







This report was realized by the Chilean Antarctic Institute on behalf of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to certify the provisions stated in Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty. 
In this season, eight Antarctic stations were inspected, one protected area, and only 
one vessel, the M/V “Orion” from Ecuador. However, there is no report from this 
season into the Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty Inspections Database to research the 




In this season the report was created from a joint inspection under Article VII of the 
Antarctic Treaty by United Kingdom, Italian and Korean observers. The inspection 
included eleven permanent stations, five summer-only stations, and three tourist 
vessels. 
 
Regarding vessel inspections, the first one was the M/V “Explorer”, which was a 
tourism vessel registered in Monrovia and its tour operators were members of IAATO. 
The inspectors found that the vessel were well equipped with a wide range of modern 
equipment, well qualified crew members on board with prior Antarctic and Artic 
experience. With respect to waste management and disposal, the inspectors concluded 
that the vessel operated in accordance with MARPOL and IMO regulations and during 
Antarctic operations no waste was dumped. However, waste stored on the after-deck 
was poorly secured against heavy weather. In addition, the vessel crew members were 
not aware of the Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty. Regarding the 
prevention of oil pollution, the vessel argued that an oil spill contingency plan was in 
preparation but no booms or equipment to deal with spills were carried on board 
although the vessel was flagged in a MARPOL State and was aware of the special 
IMO Antarctic provisions. With  regard to the emergency response plan and vessel 
safety the inspectors found that there was neither any formal emergency response plan 
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nor specific backup. However,  the vessel had the necessary information to allow 
contact to be made with all tour vessels and stations in the area. The vessel was found 
well for operations in Antarctica and carried a range of updated nautical charts. 
However, some issues with the employment of navigational aids were noted by the 
observers. Moreover, the open lifeboats were not ideal for survival in Antarctic waters, 
but survival suits were carried for the crew and passengers. Finally, the inspectors 
stated that the vessel’s crew and passengers demonstrated a commitment to the 
Antarctic Treaty and its regulations. 
 
The second vessel inspected was the M/V “Akademik Sergey Vavilov”, an 
oceanographic research vessel registered in Russia and operated by the Russian 
Academy of Sciences. The crew presented adequate experience in Antarctic 
navigation, and the vessel was equipped with modern navigational equipment. 
Regarding waste management and disposal, the crew were aware of the MARPOL 
provisions, and although they did not had full appreciation of the special IMO 
provisions for the area, the vessel was acting in accordance with these. With  regard to 
the prevention of oil pollution, the vessel presented an oil spill contingency plan; 
however, no booms or other equipment were carried on board. With respect to the 
emergency response plan and vessel safety, the inspectors noted that no plan was 
known to exist on board but it was argued that the vessel was able to contact other 
vessels in the area. Moreover, another issue related to safety was the use of the Russian 
language for all the notices on board instead of the English language. In addition, the 
vessel had enclosed lifeboats and appropriate associated equipment. As a conclusion, 
the inspectors noted that the vessel was crewed by competent persons, with appropriate 
technology and aware about the Antarctic environment. 
 
The last vessel inspected was the M/V “Europa”, a Germany cruise liner where neither 
the shipowner nor the tourism operator were affiliated to the IAATO. Although the 
crew had experience operating in the Artic, that was the first time for the vessel to 
operate in Antarctica which represented a lack of experience operating in the area. 
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Regarding waste management and disposal, the observers noted that there were 
awareness of MARPOL; however, the vessel did not have  a copy of the Environmental 
Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty. With respect to the prevention of oil pollution, the 
vessel regularly entered United Stated waters and meet all the regulations. With  regard 
to emergency response and vessel safety, the inspectors found that there was no 
evidence of emergency response plan tailored to Antarctic conditions on board. As a 
conclusion of the inspection, the observers detected that the vessel was not specially 
ice-strengthened for Antarctic conditions; some navigational aids like radars and 
nautical charts were not appropriated; the lack of experience of the crew was a mayor 
issue to operate in the area; the lifeboats were not ideal for survival in Antarctica. 
Finally, the observers concluded that they strongly recommended that a vessel of this 
size (294 crew members and 530 passengers) should be discouraged from operating in 





In this season the report was created from a joint inspection under Article VII of the 
Antarctic Treaty by governments of Belgium and France in Eastern Antarctica. In this 
case three stations were inspected, one abandoned station and one vessel. 
 
The vessel inspected was the M/V “Aurora Australis”, an Australian special purpose 
icebreaker designed for the special operations in the Southern Ocean. The vessel 
belonged to the Australian Antarctic Division with the purpose conducting of logistic 
and scientific research operations. The inspectors observed that the Master and his 
crew were generally not very well aware of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty 
System. However, the fact that they managed the vessel according to procedures and 
guidelines established by the Australian Antarctic Division, ensured that the vessel 
was operated in compliance with the Antarctic Treaty System regulations. In addition, 
the inspectors noted that the vessel was equipped with modern communication and 
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navigation systems. Regarding fuel storage and handling, the related pollution 
prevention was stated as a good example of best practices for fuel handling and storage 
in Antarctica, showed an arrangement that allowed minimizing the risk of oil spill in 
case of hull damage. Even though the vessel carried a comprehensive oil spill 
contingency plan, very limited oil spill response equipment was observed on board. 
Another observance from the inspectors was the repeated disturbance of the wildlife 
due to the very close passing through animal concentrations, which also showed the 
absence of bridge procedures or guidelines concerning the avoidance of wildlife 
disturbance by the vessel. With respect to the documentation, the Masters presented 
updated copies of all the relevant documents regarding the Antarctic Treaty System. 
As a conclusion of the inspection, the observers noted that the vessel activity was 
according to the regulations of the Antarctic Treaty System; however, further attention 
should be given by the operators to the impact on Antarctic wildlife of vessels 
operating in Antarctica. 
 
Another inspection was developed jointly with United Kingdom and German 
observers on the Antarctic Peninsula. The first vessel inspected was the M/V 
“Akademik Ioffe” a Russian research/tourism vessel chartered by the tour operators 
from Canada and the United States, both IAATO members. The inspectors found 
updated nautical charts and modern navigation and communication equipment 
according to the necessities of the operations. In addition, the crew was observed as 
experienced persons. Regarding waste management and disposal, the vessel operated 
in full compliance with MARPOL regulations. Despite a clear understanding of the 
Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protocol, the observers did not found evidence of 
documentation on board. With respect to the prevention of oil pollution, the inspectors 
noted that the oil contingency plan was in place and specific crew trained; however, 
the provision of oil response equipment and materials was limited. As a conclusion of 
the inspections, observers noted that the vessel was conducting Antarctic activities 
complying fully with both IAATO and Antarctic Treaty regulations.  
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The other vessel inspected was the M/V “Marco Polo”, a Bahamas registered tourism 
vessel which was a non-Treaty party and not a member of the IAATO. The observers 
found appropriate navigation equipment, communication systems, and updated 
nautical charts. In addition, the UK Admiralty Pilot was present. Regarding waste 
management and disposal, the vessel operated in full compliance with MARPOL 
regulations. In respect of the prevention of oil pollution, the inspectors found that oil 
pollution containment booms and clean-up dispersants were held on board and the 
crew trained in the relevant emergency procedures. With regard to emergency 
response plan and vessel safety, comprehensive on-going emergency response training 
was given to the crew and passengers prior to sailing. Moreover, the vessel had 10 
semi-enclosed lifeboats. As a conclusion, the observers noted that the vessel was well 
found, ice strengthened, well trained crew, and efficient in the ice operations; however, 
the vessel presented serious difficulties in the case of an emergency because the search 
and rescue maneuvers would have been endangered due to the number of passengers 





In this Season the report was created from a joint inspection under Article VII of the 
Antarctic Treaty by the governments of the United Kingdom, Australia and Peru. In 
this case twenty four stations, five protected areas and one vessel were inspected. 
 
The vessel inspected was the M/V “Professor Molchanov” a Russian flagged vessel 
chartered by a United States tour operator member of the IAATO. The observers found 
modern communication and navigation equipment, with a well experienced crew 
regarding Antarctic operations. Regarding waste management the vessel complied 
with all the MARPOL regulations. With respect to the prevention of marine pollution 
the observers noted that the vessel showed an in-date oil record book and the shipboard 
oil pollution emergency plan. As regards the vessel safety and emergency response 
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plan, the vessel was well equipped to operate in Antarctic waters. As a conclusion, the 
observers stated that the vessel had copies of the Antarctic Treaty documentation 
available for the crew and passengers and the operation was under the regulations of 





In this season the report was created from an inspection under Article VII of the 
Antarctic Treaty by the government of the United States of America. In this case seven 
stations and three vessels were inspected. 
 
The first vessel inspected was the M/V “National Geographic Endeavour”, with flag 
from Bahamas and chartered by a tour operator from the United States of America 
who was a full member of IAATO. The inspectors found that the Master was a 
qualified ice pilot and the crew presented considerable Antarctic experience, following 
all SOLAS and IAATO requirements. All the legal documents regarding Antarctic 
Treaty System were presented by the Master. In addition, the vessel showed modern 
navigation and communication equipment according to the requirements of the 
Antarctic operations. Regarding oil pollution, the vessel had a shipboard oil pollution 
emergency plan, and spill response materials and equipment were found on board. 
However, the inspectors observed that the vessel had limited capacity to respond to an 
oil spill by another vessel. With respect to safety, the vessel had optimal equipment 
like motor life boat, life rafts, life buoys, life jacket (adults and children), immersion 
and thermal protective clothes. As a conclusion, the observers noted that the vessel 
had been operating under the regulations of MARPOL, Antarctic Treaty System and 
IAATO regulations regarding oil pollution, waste management, non-indigenous 
species control, and environmental conservation in protected areas. 
 
 50
The second vessel inspected was the M/V “Lyubov Orlova”, a Malta flagged vessel 
chartered by a United States tour operator which was member of IAATO. The 
inspectors noted that it was very difficult to speak properly with the crew due to the 
lack of the English language among the crew members who explained that they had 
enough experience operating in Antarctica. In addition, the Master showed that all the 
regulatory documentation was on board. Regarding navigation aids, the inspectors 
noted that the vessel had a standard suite of navigation equipment together with a 
proper communication equipment, but without internet connection. With respect to the 
pollution control and safety, the observers stated that the vessel had uncovered 
lifeboats and rafts, the fire emergency plan was presented, the shipboard oil pollution 
emergency plan was carried on board and the vessel had enough absorbents and clean 
elements. Moreover, the Master showed that the vessel had a search and rescue plan 
in place. It is important to note that this vessel had run aground in Antarctica earlier 
this season, and after the inspections in Argentina, the vessel continued with the 
voyage (see Chapter 2). As a conclusion, the observers noted that the vessel has been 
operating under the regulations of MARPOL, Antarctic Treaty System and IAATO 
regulations regarding oil pollution, waste management, and environmental 
conservation. 
 
The third vessel inspected was the M/V “Explorer II”, a passenger Bahamian flagged 
vessel owned by an United Kingdom tour operator and IAATO member. The observers 
noted that the Master and crew had plenty of experience operating in Antarctic waters, 
showing all the regulatory documents and visitors guidance from the Antarctic Treaty 
System and IAATO specifications, in different languages. Regarding navigation aids, 
the inspectors observed that the vessel had a standard suite of navigation equipment 
together with a proper communication equipment, but without internet connection. 
With respect to the pollution control and safety, the observers stated that the vessel 
had covered lifeboats, the fire emergency plan was presented, the shipboard oil 
pollution emergency plan was carried on board and the vessel had enough absorbents 
and clean elements in two different places on board. Moreover, the Master showed 
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that the vessel had a search and rescue plan in place. As a conclusion, the observers 
noted that the vessel had been operating under the regulations of MARPOL, Antarctic 
Treaty System and IAATO regulations regarding oil pollution, waste management, 





In this Season the report was created from a joint inspection under Article VII of the 
Antarctic Treaty by governments of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain. 
In this case, fourteen stations, three protected areas and four vessels were inspected. 
 
The first vessel inspected was the M/V “Ocean Diamond”, a tourism cruise ship 
flagged in the Bahamas and chartered by as United State tour operator, member of 
IAATO. The observers noted that the Master and crew were well versed in the 
requirements and responsibilities regarding Antarctic Treaty and IAATO,  and showed 
that the necessary documents regarding safety, Antarctic Treaty and environmental 
considerations were on board. The vessel had a contingency plan for pollution or oil 
spill, with enough material to deal with the issue. However, the procedures and drills 
had not been executed recently. In addition, the vessel operated under the regulations 
of MARPOL regarding oil pollution and waste management. The safety elements were 
adequate and fire exercises registered in the log book. As a conclusion, the observers 
noted that the vessel has been operating under the regulations of MARPOL, Antarctic 
Treaty System and IAATO regulations regarding oil pollution, waste management, 
and environmental protection. 
 
The second vessel inspected was the M/V “Plancius”, a Dutch flagged tourism cruise 
ship, IAATO member. The inspectors stated that the Master and crew were well 
experienced operating in Antarctica and well informed in the requirements and 
responsibilities regarding Antarctic Treaty and IAATO, and showed that the necessary 
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documents regarding Antarctic Treaty and environmental matters were on board. The 
vessel had a contingency plan for pollution or oil spill, with enough materials to deal 
with a contingency. However, the procedure and drills had not been exercised recently. 
In addition, the vessel operated under the regulations of MARPOL regarding oil 
pollution and waste management. The safety element were adequate and fire exercises 
registered in the log book. As a conclusion, the observers noted that the vessel has 
been operating under the regulations of MARPOL, Antarctic Treaty System and 
IAATO regulations regarding oil pollution, waste management, and environmental 
protection. 
 
The third vessel inspected in this season was the M/V “Silver Explorer”, a Bahamas’ 
flag cruise vessel chartered by an IAATO member tour operator not named in the 
report. The observers noted that the crew had experience operating in Antarctica and 
the Master showed all the documents regarding Antarctic Treaty and IAATO on board, 
like the environmental plan and education programme for the passengers. The vessel 
had a contingency plan for pollution or oil spill, with enough materials to contain any 
spill incident. In addition, the vessel operated under the regulations of MARPOL 
regarding oil pollution and waste management. The safety elements were adequate and 
fire exercises registered in the log book. As a conclusion, the observers noted that the 
vessel has been operating under the regulations of MARPOL, Antarctic Treaty System 
and IAATO regulations regarding oil pollution, waste management, and 
environmental protection; manned by a professional and well drilled crew. 
 
The last vessel inspected in this season was the M/V “Corinthian II” a tourism cruise 
flagged in the Marshal Islands chartered by a United States tour operator, IAATO 
member. The observers noted that the Master and crew had experience operating in 
Antarctic waters, showing all the regulatory documents and visitors guidance from the 
Antarctic Treaty System and IAATO specifications. The vessel had a contingency plan 
for pollution or oil spill, with enough materials to contain any spill incident. As a 
conclusion, inspectors stated that the vessel was well equipped, trained, and prepared 
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In this Season the report was created from a joint inspection under Article VII of the 
Antarctic Treaty by governments of the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. In 
this case thirteen stations, and seven tourism vessels were inspected. 
 
The vessels inspected were the follows: 
 M/V “Ushuaia”, a Comoros flagged tourism vessel chartered by a Canadian 
tour operator, IAATO member; 
 M/V “Hanse Explorer”, an Antigua and Barbuda flagged tourism vessel 
chartered by a German tour operator, IAATO member; 
 M/V “Sea Adventurer”, a Bahamas flagged tourism vessel chartered by an 
United States tour operator, IAATO member; 
 M/V “Bremen”, a Bahamas flagged tourism vessel chartered by a German tour 
operator, IAATO member; 
 M/V “Expedition”, a Liberian flagged tourism vessel chartered by a Canadian 
tour operator, IAATO member; 
 M/V “Akademik Sergey Vavilov”, a Russian Federation flagged research vessel 
chartered by a Canadian tour operator, IAATO member; 
 M/V “National Geographic Explorer”, a Bahamas flagged tourism vessel 
chartered by an United States tour operator, IAATO member; 
 
According to the report, all the vessels had well trained crew members with vast 
experience operating in the Antarctic environment. With respect to  oil pollution and 
waste management, all the vessels operated under the MARPOL, Antarctic Treaty and 
IAATO regulations regarding control and final disposition. In addition, the operators 
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showed according to the equipment to afford an accidental oil spill and the appropriate 
oil pollution emergency plan. All the navigation and communication equipment was 
modern, according to the requirements to operate in Antarctica. Regarding 
environmental protection, all the vessel had operated under the regulations of the 
Antarctic Treaty and IAATO, and given information of the regulations to all the 
passengers during the visits. As a conclusion of the visits, the inspectors concluded 
that all the vessels had adequate equipment and training to operate in Antarctic waters. 
Moreover, all the vessels operated under Antarctic Treaty regulations.   
 
 
3.3 Conclusion  
 
In this Chapter all the reports from the Antarctic Treaty System have been researched 
and analyzed regarding the inspections executed since 1966 to 2015. With respect to 
tourism vessels, in this period ten inspection reports, totaling twenty-five vessels 
visited and inspected, were analyzed. All the inspections were carried out by observers 
of Antarctic Treaty parties, and the reports were drawn up by the different Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs. The inspectors had observed the accomplishment of the Antarctic 
Treaty regulations, MARPOL and IAATO regulations inspecting matters such as crew 
experience and training, navigation and communication equipment, oil pollution and 
waste management, and environmental protection. However, conforming to 
regulations did not prevent the vessels sinking due to human error. In this case, more 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In this research effort, various regulatory instruments have been presented. 
Considering the Protocol on Environmental Protection as a very influential 
regulatory framework regarding operations in Antarctica, it was discussed at a 
sufficient level of detail. It was signed by the member states of the Antarctic Treaty 
in 1991 with the objective of the development a regulatory framework for the 
protection of the Antarctic environment and its associated ecosystems. It is 
important to understand that this Protocol is intended to be accomplished by the 
Member States signatories of the Antarctic Treaty only, for all the operations in 
Antarctica, including tourism activities.  
In summary, the Protocol states the importance of an environmental impact 
assessment, marine pollution prevention and waste management, protection areas, 
and the liability derived from possible environmental emergencies. Despite this 
protocol is mandatory for member states only who comply with all the regulations; 
on the positive side,  the inspections executed and analyzed have demonstrated a 
high level of compliance. However, due to the tourism business being a constantly 
increasing activity, the signatory members of the Antarctic Treaty may considerer 
to discuss the inclusion of new member States into the Antarctic Treaty System. 
This is especially important for those operators using tourism vessels under “flag of 
convenience” operating in Antarctica.    
Furthermore, two important instruments developed by the IMO, the MARPOL and 
the Polar Code,  were analyzed under the wider framework of the current research. 
MARPOL is intended to prevent pollution of the marine environment derived from 
vessel operations or accidental causes. This protocol states the methods to prevent 
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the oil, waste, and noxious substances pollution derived from vessel operations in 
the special areas. However, it is important to evaluate the necessity to incorporate 
regulations regarding the number of drills to enhance the ability to respond when 
facing an oil spill incident. In addition, it is important to understand that both, 
MARPOL and SOLAS/Polar Code are instruments at the strategic level. States are 
responsible for the implementation and supervision, and in that level more can be 
done. 
Regarding operations in polar waters and in an effort to boost the level of safety, the 
Polar Code was developed to protect vessels, crew and passengers in severe 
conditions of the waters surrounding both poles. It is important to understand that 
this instrument was developed under the SOLAS framework and it is considered as 
a proactive regulatory framework not only to ensure safety operations in polar 
waters but also to protect the fragile environment of the region. This Code stipulates 
different issues related to the navigation in polar waters and states safety provisions 
regarding equipment, vessel construction, vessel operations and manning. However 
improvement should be expected in the near future.  
In addition, this Code is complementary to the provisions stated by MARPOL 
regarding oil, invasive species, sewage, garbage and chemical pollution. Moreover, 
many different issues that could jeopardize the operations in polar waters were 
described, for instance navigation and communication equipment, use of radar and 
updated nautical charts. As examples of the importance to ensure safe operations in 
Antarctica, between 1987 and 2012, nine incidents with passenger vessels were 
registered, of which three ended sunk with different environmental impacts. Another 
important aspect of this instrument is the manning and training. This matter is 
addressed in chapter 12 where the code states that every crew member should be 
familiarized with all the requirements of the PWOM. However, the mentioned 
chapter only applies for Masters and Officers, but PWOM must be useful for all the 
crew. This training should include medical issues to deal with the Antarctic Commented [MOU11]: I hope I got this right. 
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environment. In addition, it is important to establish an adequate SAR agreement 
between the different states operating in Antarctica. One example is the combined 
patrol between Argentine and Chile, where both States have vessels in stations 
around Antarctic peninsula and Shetland Islands to cover SAR operations between 
December and April every year.  
Even though all the regulatory framework analyzed showed its importance to ensure 
safety operations in Antarctica, there are other issues related to the operations such 
as  technological equipment and training. As has been pointed out in Chapter 2, one 
of the most important issues that jeopardize the Antarctic operations is the nautical 
chart quality. Different States interested in Antarctica means different map 
information and grades, and although all the modern vessels have Electronic Chart 
Display Information System (ECDIS) not all countries have Electronic Nautical 
Charts (ENC) available to be acquired by the operators.  
It is recommended that all the operators should have the most adequate and updated 
nautical charts, and all the ENC available as much as possible. In addition, it is 
essential that the crew should be trained in using nautical charts and ENC handling, 
particularly for Masters and navigation Officers. Another recommendation is the 
inclusion of all the stakeholders in the Long Range Identification and Tracking 
(LRIT) system. The objective of this system is to provide identification and tracking 
for all the vessels operating in Antarctica. With the implementation, it is possible to 
assure safety and environmental protection because tourism vessels, tour operators, 
Antarctic Treaty member States and the Antarctic stations could be linked with the 
information of all the vessels operating in Antarctica. In case of an incident, all the 
vessels and stations in the vicinity will be informed about the issue, so it could be 
possible to react and assist the incident in an efficient manner. As an example of 
linked operations, IAATO maintains close contact between tourism vessels 
operating in Antarctica. 
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With respect to the tourism activities specifically, the IAATO promotes and 
practices environmentally responsible operations from the private-sector tourism 
operators. At the moment, more than 100 tourism operators from different countries 
are members of the IAATO, which increases the number of monitoring systems in 
order to comply with international regulations. However, this system only applies 
for operators who are members of the Association and this means that any tourism 
vessel operating outside the Association will not be reached by the control and report 
system. IAATO set some special visitors guidelines to be followed for the operators 
and visitors like Antarctic protection (Appendix A and C), waste reduction 
(Appendix B), and how to avoid the introduction of non-native species in Antarctica 
(Appendix 4).  
Regarding the inspections executed by State members according to the Antarctic 
Treaty provisions, the inspectors had observed the accomplishment of the Antarctic 
Treaty regulations, MARPOL and IAATO regulations inspecting matters like crew 
experience and training, navigation and communication equipment, oil pollution and 
waste management, and environmental protection. However, the principal issues 
found was the insufficient oil spill materials on board, lack of training regarding oil 
spill response drills, and lack of English language (particularly in Russian vessels). 
To deal with this issue, the operators should assure an increase of the crew training; 
not only regarding drills, but also in English language in concordance with the 
STCW Convention.    
To summarize, currently the vessel operation in Antarctica is composed of 
operations mostly for tourism and a reduced number of voyages related to logistic 
and fishing operations. The tourism activities showed an increasing rate year after 
year and it appear as it will continue to grow, considering that the climate change 
allows to go more deeply into the continent. Actually, the regulatory framework 
seems to be adequate to deal with the issue of the increasing tourism activities in 
Antarctica. However, it is important to considerer with further research on the issue 
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of how this increasing activity in Antarctica will have an impact the environment. 
Additionally, it should be essential to research how crew training, traffic control and 
SAR operations could be improved in order to minimize the risks of tourism vessel 
operations in the Antarctica, which could jeopardize this fragile environment.  
As a final conclusion, the provisions included with the Madrid Protocol, MARPOL, 
Polar Code and IAATO show that the regulations had a positive impact on the 
operations assuring best-practices to protect the environment. However, the 
incidents occurring between 2006 and 2011 demonstrated that the importance to 
ensure safe operations and high manning levels in Antarctica is essential to deal with 
the operations in this hostile environment with severe weather conditions. To 
achieve this objective, it is important to assure the correct implementation of all the 
regulations addressed in this research. Furthermore, it is especially important to 
generate a culture of cooperation between States to ensure an adequate response in 
case of disaster to minimize environmental risks and maintain the Antarctica as 
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